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University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Mid-American Review of Sociology, 1984, Vol. IX, No. 2:59-77 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper (a) presents a systems framework for conceptualizing 
epistemological issues in sociology, (b) links this framework to axio-
logical responsibilities, and then (c) locates both the epistemological 
and axiological discussions within the patriarchal ideology and hierar-
chical power structure of American sociology. I t is argued that adopting 
an activist, emancipatory ideological position obligates social scientists 
to critically review their axiological commitments and epistemological 
premises. Major arguments are set in italics to permit a quick scan of 
the paper. These arguments form an epistemological position paper for 
the closing of the Twentieth Century. 
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
The several philosophical, methodological, and theoretical perspectives 
in sociology are here conceived as knowledge-producing systems. 
The concept of "knowledge-producing system" adopted here is 
an analytical framework for thinking about the various sociological 
perspectives. The framework is adapted from Radnitzky (1973) who 
applies system-theoretic concepts to investigate differing styles of 
scientific thought. He conceives of "science" as essentially "a knowl-
edge-producing and knowledge-improving enterprise." Each such enter-
prise is conceptualized as a "system" composed of a set of interrelated 
elements. 
The terms "positivism," "empiricism," "Marxism," "structural-
ism," "feminism," "hermeneutics," "existentialism," "idealism," 
"pragmatism," "phenomenology," "dramaturgy," "symbolism," and 
* An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meetings of the 
Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago, Illinois, April 18-21, 1984. 
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so forth are markers identifying major orientations in sociology. These 
differing perspectives are "knowledge-producing systems" which can 
be identified, examined, and discussed. Further, each knowledge-
producing system can be assessed in terms of its effectiveness (either 
demonstrated or potential) in accomplishing various social projects. 
This schema goes a reasonable distance in clarifying the epistemological, 
axiological, and political debates which so often cloud the sociological 
''horizon. 
There is no limit on the number of systems which m~ be invented or 
proposed. 
No a priori limit can be placed on the number of knowledge-
producing systems which may be introduced for discussion and utiliza-
tion in sociology. It is dichotomizing persiflage to suggest that only one 
epistemological conceptualization of sociology is legitimate while all 
others are illegitimate. To so suggest is a premature blunder which not 
only tosses out charlatans, but also dismisses serious, creative thinkers 
in the same throw. The intellectual errors arising from hastily struc-
turing epistemological debates on dichotomous lines (e.g., "science" vs. 
"non-science") are divisive, unproductive, and unnecessary. 
It is understandable that those who cut their sociological teeth as 
positivists are not accustomed to especially wide interpretations of 
"science." The positivist tradition has been so overwhelmingly accepted 
in North America that any other perspective is necessarily regarded as 
"unscientific." This massive acceptance of· the positivist model is the 
root cause of whatever "strangeness" may be felt to lie with the asser-
tion that alternative, non-positivist viewpoints in sociology today also 
claim the "scientific" label with equal rationale. 
Phenomenology, for example, makes "scientific" claims. One of 
Husserl's main objectives was to establish science on what he believed 
to be a foundation more solid than that on which positivism has been 
erected. We are reminded that throughout his work, "Husserl's commit-
ment to the ideal of a rigorous science never wavered" (Spiegelberg, 
1971:77, emphasis added). Amedeo Giorgi echoed Husserl's founda-
tional theme in his attempt to establish phenomenological psychology: 
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Through a utilization of the philosophical tenets of existential phe-
nomenology, we are attempting to found psychology conceived as a 
human science (Giorgi et al., 1971 :xi, emphasis added). 
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Phenomenologists turn specifically toward the study of man and assert 
that human science should be grounded on philosophical roots rather 
different from those embraced by logical positivists. 
Structuralists provide a further exemplar. It is fully reasonable to 
consider structuralists "scientific" inasmuch as they are committed to 
intellectual rigor and have contributed much to linguistics, cybernetics, 
and our understanding of logic. Yet, like the phenomenologists, they 
have been extremely critical oflogical positivism. An example is a paper 
by Emmon Bach (1965): 
... which for all its courtesy and fairness, is a severe critique of 
logical positivism and the linguistic methods it inspired (Piaget, 
1970:83). 
Such examples can be presented many times over. The point is that 
there are many alternative viewpoints in sociology which consider 
themselves to be both "scientific" and non-positivist. 
Nontheless, there are several sociologists who eschew the term 
"science" although it would be entirely reasonable on various philo-
sophical grounds to characterize them as "scientists." Their rejection of 
"science" does not signal their abandonment of intellectual rigor, but 
rather their rejection of the political connotations attached to 
"science" in a society wholly permeated by the positivist conception of 
"science." As a remedy, this paper adopts the label "knowledge-
producing system" to identify all perspectives, viewpoints, or paradigms 
in the social sciences without too early pre-judging whether a given 
perspective is scientific, scientistic, or merely stupid. 
Each system is composed of three major elements: (a) metascientific 
worldviews, (b) methodologies, and (c) theories. 
Knowledge-producing systems have three basic components: 
metascientific worldviews, methodologies and theories. These elements 
are interrelated such that input through anyone element has the poten-
tial to affect the other components of the system. Although these 
systems may incorporate various contradictions, they strain toward 
logical consistency. This tendency is introduced by the builders and 
users of the systems. Before discussing these features of knowledge-
producing systems, each component part is introduced. 
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Metascientific Worldviews: The metascientific worldview of each 
perspective provides the background or tradition in which 
specific theories and methodologies are developed and evaluated. 
It includes the philosophical groundplan, beliefs, traditions, 
values, logic, and evaluative criteria of a given perspective. 
In its philosophically programmatic aspects, each sociological 
perspective contains an identifiable metascientific worldview. This 
conception of "metascientific worldview" is more inclusive than 
Radnitzky's (1973) general scheme in that "philosophical groundplan" 
and "metascience" have been combined into a single element here 
called the "metascientific worldview." It is less inclusive than Lein-
fellner's (1974) concept of "epitheory" which gives primary attention 
to the "norms, values, and obligations" implied in a given theory and 
systematically delivers: 
. . . the background knowledge into which a social theory is 
embedded and without which we may not fully understand such a 
theory. It constructs step by step the whole cultural and social 
superstructure or background knowledge (Leinfellner, 1974:40, 
emphasis added). 
The framework proposed here is in sympathy with Leinfellner's wider 
aim, but, for the purposes of initial analysis, is restricted to the scien-
tific community with which a particular perspective is associated. Axio-
logical analysis of each knowledge-producing system necessitates 
reference to the larger societal and cultural values in which each system 
is embedded, but the specifically epistemological task is simplified if a 
less inclusive circle is drawn around the various viewpoints in sociology. 
The proposed definition of "metascientific worldview" is also 
similar in many respects to Thomas Kuhn's (1970) first (as opposed to 
his more specific and second) use of the term "paradigm." He suggests 
that "paradigm" may be used to stand: 
... for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so 
on shared by the members of a given community (Kuhn, 1970: 175). 
The present framework is not at odds with this definition of "para-
digm." Rather, it includes specific knowledge claims under the term 
"theory" and data collection techniques under the term "method-
ology." 
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Methodologies: Methodologies are procedural rules which guide 
researchers in the active exploration of selected dimensions of 
social behavior and experience. 
These rules are rooted in and are compatible with the metascien-
tific worldview of the researcher. The "discoveries," "reports," or 
"findings" which result from the application of these rules form the 
"contents" which are the object of theoretical organization. 
Theories: Theories are content-oriented conceptual frameworks 
formulated under the auspices of given metascientific world-
views. They are organizing devices which reveal or assert that 
selected dimensions of social behavior or experience are related 
in particular ways. 
The organizationa1logic of theories and the dimensions of social 
behavior or experience selected for theoretical attention are influenced 
by the metascientific worldview to which a given theory-builder sub-
scribes. It is through the use of theories that sociologists claim to 
present understanding or knowledge of the nature of society in general 
and human behavior or experience in particular. 
This definition of "theory" is more general than that accepted 
under logical positivism (Hill, 1981). For the positivist, a "theory" is an 
axiomatized, deductively interconnected system of axioms, theorems, 
and definitions. At the same time, the definition proposed here is less 
general than that suggested by Amedeo Giorgi (1975), a phenom-
enologist: 
Theory is sometimes used in the sense of a perspective or viewpoint. 
In that sense, phenomenology is a theory of science, of man, of the 
world in the sense that it attempts a coherent description and inter-
pretation of all phenomena that can be experienced by man, but it 
also recognizes that it is but one among many such viewpoints or 
perspectives and it does not consider itself to be a dogmatic source 
of knowledge that cannot be challenged (Giorgi, 1975, personal 
communication ). 
Giorgi's use of theory overlaps with the above definition of metascien-
tific worldview insofar as he calls a theory a "viewpoint" or "perspec-
tive." Still, he gives emphasis to coherent description and in this sense 
his conceptualization is compatible with the ideas expressed ·in the 
definition of theory offered in this paper. 
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The elements in each system are interdependent. 
Each alternative perspective in sociology is a "system" with inter-
dependent elements. Radnitzky (1973) summarized the nature of this 
interdependence when he asserted that the following observation is 
justified: 
The active researcher cannot avoid to apply theories and to adopt, 
explicitly or implicitly some theoretical position. The theory-builder 
cannot avoid to adopt some metascientific position, e.g., in connec-
tion with the appraisal of competing knowledge systems, explana-
tory patterns, etc. The metascientific position in turn will be 
anchored in some philosophical groundplan, even if the latter is not 
articulated (Radnitzky, 1973 : xii-xiii). 
Even if it is not articulated, the philosophical groundplan embedded in 
the metascientific worldview influences metascientific logic, theory 
construction, and theory-guided methodological activity. 
Each system attempts to maintain consistency among its elements 
according to its own rules of organization and logic. 
The elements in each system are interdependent in a logically 
consistent manner. The nature of this "logic" is internally defined for 
each system. This strain for consistency is a fundamental characteristic 
of sociological enterprises whether they claim the label of "science" or 
not. 
Strain on the internal consistency of a system may be introduced 
through any of the system's elements. Logically consistent inputs are 
accommodated without producing strain within the system. However, 
inputs which are incompatible with the overall logical consistency of 
the system are handled in either one of two ways: (1) First, and most 
likely, the incompatible inputs will be rejected so that the overall 
logical consistency of the system can be maintained. Thus, discoveries 
which cannot be theoretically organized, given the logic of the meta-
scientific worldview, will be labelled "not relevant" or "errors." (2) 
Second, in unusually compelling situations, the inputs may be accepted 
and thus produce strain within the system. This may happen when 
"errors" and "anomalies" persist and become troublesome. Kuhn 
(1970) refers to such situations as "crises." 
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According to Kuhn, a crisis often provides the motive force 
required to produce a scientific revolution in which an old paradigm is 
shelved in favor of a new framework which explains or takes care of the 
"anomalies." A system in crisis breaks down and is beyond repair. In 
less catastrophic situations, however, the acceptance of strain within 
the system may result in a stress reducing re-ordering of the entire 
system with a view toward re-establishing the overall consistency of the 
system by requiring sub-revolutionary changes in each of the system's 
interrelated elements. 
Each system is epistemologically accountable only to its own rules of 
organization and logic. 
The logic of each system is internal and cannot be fruitfully 
judged on external epistemological grounds. Each system has its own 
rules of logic and criteria for deciding when it has produced or 
improved "knowledge." This position does not, however, argue for a 
state of intellectual anarchy in which "anything goes." 
It is a fully proper epistemological task to question the internal 
consistency of a given perspective. But, this inquiry must be accom-
plished on the perspective's home turf. If analysis reveals serious 
internal contradictions or intellectual lacunae, the critic is obligated to 
present them and the relevant theorists must get busy with the needed 
repairs, if repairs are possible. 
Responsible epistemological allegiance to a system requires its adher-
ents to (a) fully articulate the elements in their system, (b) examine the 
system for internal inconsistencies, (c) propose remedies for inconsis-
tencies when they are discovered, and (d) clearly identify and publicize 
any inconsistencies which prove unresponsive to diligent remedial 
efforts. 
It is possible and responsible to ask the proponents of a given 
perspective to articulate their system, to explicate the rules of logic 
they apply, and to demonstrate that their perspective hangs together 
according to the rules of logic which they have themselves selected. The 
critic, however, must also demand the same analysis of the perspective 
to which he/she gives allegiance. The call for reciprocal and reflexive 
investigations of one's adopted knowledge-producing system lies at the 
heart of epistemological responsibility. 
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Epistemological investigation may frequently require the excavation 
and reconstruction of "missing elements" in knowledge-producing 
systems. 
Critics or proponents who attempt to outline a given sociological 
perspective may encounter the problem that the system's founders did 
not carefully articulate all of the elements in their system. Radnitzky 
indicated above that the elements are not always clearly explicated or 
understood by the researchers who adhere to a particular perspective. 
Some of the elements may be "missing." These must be excavated and 
reconstructed if the knowledge-producing system is to be seen as a 
whole. 
Piaget's structuralism provides an example of the need for epis-
temological reconstruction. Piaget (1970: 126) asserted that "structural-
ism cannot be a particular doctrine or philosophy" and, further, that 
"structuralism is essentially a method." What is "missing" in this 
example is the clear articulation of a metascientific worldview. 
The guiding rule for reconstruction is the principle that the re-
constructed metascientific worldview must be logically consistent with 
the theoretical and methodological elements in the system. The logical 
system itself must be inferred from the manner in which perspectival 
advocates utilize and construct their methodologies and theories. The 
critic as well as the proponent who would understand any perspectival 
viewpoint in contemporary sociology should be prepared to engage 
deeply and seriously in the archaeology and reconstruction of theories, 
methodologies, and metascientific worldviews. 
THE AXIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
Values are foundational for both knowledge-producing systems and 
social projects. 
Values are embedded inthe metascientific worldviews of socio-
logical perspectives. There are no' presuppositionless perspectives in 
the philosophical spectrum from phenomenology to positivism (cf., 
Eckhardt, 1973; Friedrichs, 1973) . Values are incorporated as pre-
suppositions in philosophical arguments which form the highest level 
in the hierarchical structure of scientific languages (Madsen, 1970). 
There are no value-free sociologies. 
However, the values incorporated within sociological perspec-
tives form only one side of the axiological problem facing sociologists. 
66 
Epistemology, Axiology, and Ideology 
Values also come into play in selecting the social projects which we 
address from a given perspectival viewpoint. Values are superordinate to 
both purpose and perspective. 
Not all knowledge-producing systems are equally well-suited for every 
social project. 
The range of possible social projects is limited only by the imagi-
nation. A few possibilities include: prediction, control, understanding, 
explanation, risk reduction, emancipation, production, distribution, 
justice, efficiency, equality, revolution, stability, innovation, anarchy, 
progress, enrichment, and so forth. No knowledge-producing system is 
well-suited to all projects. 
It would be difficult to find a phenomenologist, for example, 
who would argue that phenomenology is well-equipped for the pursuit 
of "prediction," "control," and "efficiency." At the same time, most 
phenomenologists agree that "understanding" can be realized through 
the application of phenomenology. Similar reviews are possible for the 
other prespectival viewpoints in sociology. 
The difficulty of such review, however, increases with the extent 
to which proponents of various perspectives have failed to thoroughly 
excavate and articulate the metascientific worldviews of the systems to 
which they subscribe. Such failure raises the possibility of axiological 
schizophrenia. Without an understanding of the values embedded in 
their metascientific worldviews, researchers run the risk of pursuing 
social projects with knowledge-producing systems ill-suited to selected 
tasks. 
Not all social projects embody the highest axiological principles of 
human rights and dignity. 
Matching a specific social project to an effective knowledge-
producing system is primarily an epistemological problem. On the other 
hand, deciding which social projects to pursue is a fundamentally axio-
logical issue. Axiological analyses argue that some social projects are 
more defensible than others. It is one purpose of axiological analyses 
(e.g., Buttimer, 1974; Caws, 1967; Eckhardt, 1973; Hill, 1977; Lein-
fellner, 1973) to help society identify those projects which embody the 
highest principles of human rights and dignity. 
Responsible axiological allegiance to a social project requires that its 
supporters (a) demonstrate (through research, reflexive study, and 
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group dialogue) that the project embodies the highest axiological prin-
ciples, (b) seek (or develop) an axiologically compatible knowledge-
producing system to assist in realizing the project, and (c) abandon the 
project if it no longer serves the highest axiological principles. 
Existentially, accountability may be seen as an individual respon-
sibility. Yet, group discussion of the issues involved in value-grounded 
decisions may help many of us begin the personal examination of the 
value foundations which underlie our teaching and research as well as 
our selection and endorsement of various social projects. Initiation of 
group dialogue is the responsibility of every social scientist who admits 
that discussion of value orientation is needed and reasonable. It has also 
been argued (Held, 1970) that members of a group can be held morally 
responsible if they fail to organize themselves (at least loosely) in order 
to discuss the most appropriate bases for decision when they find their 
community or society to be in a period of imminent danger, uncer-
tainty, or crisis. 
Honestly entertained, the effort to understand the value view-
points of others results in a clearer understanding of one's own values. 
The reflexive nature of this effort opens one's own views to change and 
reformulation (Floistad, 1973). Dialogue enables individuals to make 
their axiological positions explicit. 
Responsible axiological allegiance to a knowledge-producing system 
requires its adherents to (a) articulate the specific ways in which it is 
actually capable of realizing identified social projects, (b) routinely 
examine this statement for the possibility of false or over-zealous 
claims, (c) withdraw unsupported claims as soon as they are discovered, 
and (d) abandon the system if it no longer supports social projects to 
which they are responsibly committed. 
It is axiologically proper and responsible to ask perspectival ad-
vocates to identify the social projects which they believe their perspec-
tive able to address. Advocates have a responsibility to demonstrate the 
success or likelihood of their adopted system. Quite possibly, many 
perspectival advocates who attempt this demonstration will find them-
selves embarassingly empty-handed. 
Responsible social scientists must search for and support those social 
projects which embody the highest axiological principles. 
Social projects which oppress, disenfranchise, or denigrate fellow 
humans cannot be legitimately supported by social scientists. This 
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declaration is repeated, albeit somewhat embyronically, in the profes-
sional ethics code of the American Sociological Association (cf., 
Reynolds, 1983:143-169). We have sensed, as a group, the moral neces-
sity to consider the rights of research subjects. The next, as yet 
untaken, step is to examine the rights not just of research subjects but 
of all persons who may be helped or hurt through our acts as data 
collectors, methodologists, social analysts, and theoreticians. In framing 
and undertaking these activities, can we do less than seek realization of 
social projects which incorporate the highest possible axiological prin-
ciples? 
Identification of the highest axiological principles is not easy, but this 
does not mean that this task can be responsibly avoided. 
Axiological analysis has not been required in the sociological 
curriculum. Perhaps for this reason many of us face discussions of 
"values" with knots in our stomachs. We often do not know how to 
proceed. We are on unfamiliar ground. Perhaps some of us fear attacks 
on our motivations and personal integrity. 
Axiological analysis is not easy. As in philosophy generally, there 
are various axiological schools of thought. One must read, study, and 
evaluate these ideas just as carefully as many of us concentrate on the 
intricacies of sophisticated statistical techniques. 
The difficulty of value analysis does not relieve us of the obliga-
tion to begin. At the least, we can heed the advice to find and follow: 
... a good person, or at least someone who is making the effort, at 
this particular time, to be good, to discover what it would be to do 
the right thing (Machan, 1974:368). 
Obviously, we can and will make axiological mistakes. We may be 
deceived and follow the wrong lead. This is nothing new. As social ana-
lysts and theorists, we make methodological and conceptual mistakes 
all the time and we also make every effort to correct our errors and 
learn from our mistakes. It is time we invest the same effort in learning 
from our axiological failures. 
We are responsible for the axiological shape of the future. 
Values are intimately bound up in decisions concerning the route 
we will take toward the realization of the future. Caws (1967:54) as-
tutely defined values as future facts: 
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... they go from us to the world; they refer not to what is or was 
the case, but to what will or may be the case. 
Genuine values cannot be sought in the status quo although they helped 
form it. Values are realized through the active choice of alternative 
future facts. The responsibility which hangs heavily over us is to seek a 
personal and disciplinary understanding of the base on which we are 
willing to be held accountable for such decisions. It helps little to issue 
a liberal manifesto listing desirable social projects and then turn around 
and adopt sociological perspectives which insure that such projects are 
never realized. 
THE IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
Epistemological explication and axiological clarification are set within 
ideological environments. 
Discussions of epistemology and values do not occur in abstract 
isolation. They are embedded in real societies, in specific institutions, 
and in particular historical circumstances. These societies, institutions, 
and times are permeated with special interests and legitimations for 
these interests. The stage for discussion is set within an ideological 
arena. 
The ideological setting of sociology is repressively dominated by patri-
archal worldviews and hierarchical power structures. 
American sociology is centered in a hierarchically structured 
institution: American higher education. Power within this structure 
generally flows from the top down: trustees to presidents to deans to 
chairs to full professors to associate professors to assistant professors to 
instructors to graduate teaching assistants to undergraduate students. 
Academia is further dominated by patriarchy, classism, and racism (cf., 
Creutz, 1981; Hill, 1983; Maglin, 1982; Menges and Exum, 1983; New-
man, 1982; and Parenti, 1980). Not unexpectedly, these patterns of 
domination are replicated in the discipline of sociology (cf., Deegan, 
1980,1981). 
Responsible epistemological investigation and axiological discussions 
are fully possible only in settings characterized by emancipatory 
ideologies. 
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Although explorations of values and epistemology are set within 
ideological contexts, some environments are more emancipatory than 
others. If the setting is not emancipatory, the debates within it are 
structured and permeated by the ideologies of anti-emancipatory 
interests. Such debates are designed to reproduce and extend institu-
tional patterns which advance the interests of power elites. The out-
come of epistemological/axiological dialogue in such settings is ideo-
logical debate rather than responsible, emancipatory discussion. 
Epistemological/axiological debates within sociology are not essentially 
emancipatory, but instead serve patriarchal and hierarchically-structured 
interests in the academy and in society at large. 
Mirroring the ideological context of the American academy, epis-
temological/axiological discussion within sociology frequently takes the 
form of destructive, dichotomous debates. The dichotomies are often 
exceptionally crude. Familiar oppositions include: "unscientific" vs. 
"scientific"; idiographic vs. nomothetic; qualitative vs. quantitative; 
contemporary vs. traditional; micro vs. macro; philosophical vs. empir-
ical; ideological vs. value-free; applied vs. theoretical; and so forth. By 
concentrating on superficial characteristics which obscure intellectual 
substance, debates between dichotomized opponents generally destroy 
any potential for meaningful, emancipatory discovery. Deegan (1980:2) 
underscores this point: "We see that the themes of dichotomous 
thinking and elite control are common threads in patriarchal sociology." 
Dichotomous debates serve the interests of the status quo and must be 
analyzed politically rather than epistemologically. 
A nalysis of four variations on dichotomous epistemological-axiological 
debates in sociology illustrate the discipline's current state of moral 
poverty and intellectual aridity. 
Combatants in disciplinary debates over the "correct" socio-
logical perspective have vigorously pursued the elusive tasks of defining 
the nature of sociology, explicating the meaning of "truth," and legis-
lating the procedures of methodology. Because of the repressive ideo-
olgical context of these debates, however, they are framed and struc-
tured for the purpose of avoiding the serious axiological questions and 
epistemological problems which should be central. It is instructive to 
review the common strategies which so often defeat constructive per-
spectival analyses in sociology. 
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The "Synthesis" Move. 
A synthesis is often little more than a superficial "I'm OK, 
You're OK" agreement accompanied by a series of hearty handshakes 
and approving smiles. In departments ripped apart by ongoing "theory 
wars," synthesis resolutions have considerable practical value. They 
allow academia to "get back to business as usual" while temporarily 
burying the proverbial hatchet and avoiding deep critiques. The "best 
of both worlds synthesis" is soothingly political rather than intellec-
tually engaging. 
The handshakes acknowledge that the more powerful faction is 
not fully able to censure its adversaries. Thus, a "synthesis" is proposed 
in the interim while the various factions re-group and bide their time. 
Neither side gives up its core arguments in a "synthesis." Each side 
simply points out that its perspective can profitably "inform" the 
other. 
In the so-called "quantitative/qualitative" debate, for example, it 
is common for social science departments to enter into "synthesis" 
agreements in which the legitimacy of a given methodology rests par-
tially on its presumed ability to inform the work of another perspec-
tive. In practice, particularly in departments where the quantitative 
model is highly valued, this means that qualitative work is "tolerated" 
for its ability to generate "hypotheses" which can later be studied 
quantitatively, i.e., "scientifically." It matters little that this is not what 
most advocates of qualitative research understand as the fruit of their 
efforts. In terms of course requirements, a "synthesis" agreement 
means that all qualitatively-oriented students are required to complete 
courses in statistics and measurement theory, but not necessarily vice 
versa. Quantitatively-oriented students are rarely required to complete a 
qualitative methods sequence. Such one-sided requirements are evi-
dence of the political nature of a given "synthesis" agreement. 
A one-sided "synthesis" is essentially a rhetoric which permits 
the less powerful, but unbeaten, faction to limp along while saving face. 
The political consequences for students are not small when a politically-
motivated "synthesis" is arranged. Due to the rhetoric of "synthesis," 
students attracted to the perspective of the less powerful faction may 
mistakenly assume that their interests and methodological inclinations 
are valued equally with those of the "mainstream" students. It is only 
later that such students realize they have been working under a serious 
handicap, that they will have to do much more work on their own than 
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other students, that they will not have the intellectual support of the 
majority faculty, and that their work will be judged "marginal" by 
those who control access to funding and other discipline-linked per-
quisites. 
Perspectives which are not party to a "synthesis" agreement 
(due, for example, to their being unrepresented by current faculty 
members) still suffer ridicule, misunderstanding, and lack of support. 
usually only two, dichotomous views are presented. There is rarely pro-
vision for perspectives not represented by members of the current 
faculty. At best, "synthesis" outcomes are intellectually narrow. At 
worst, the outcome is political rhetoric disguised as philosophical 
dialectic. 
The "Merely Political" Move. 
Assertion that perspectival differences are merely political rather 
than "real" may sometimes be more honest but runs the risk of dismis-
sing genuine intellectual disagreements without reflexive consideration 
of the issues involved. What the "merely political" and the "synthesis" 
arguments demonstrate, however, is the exceptional extent to which 
presumably intellectual arguments involve political issues, whether 
overt or implied. The charge that one is "merely playing politics" is a 
move which pre-empts all subsequent intellectual rationalizations that 
one can offer. Marxist and feminist scholars, for exam pIe, are fre-
quently accused of political maneuvering and then ruled "out of 
court." It no longer matters that a brilliant case is presented for one's 
perspective. It need not be listened to if the field of play is defined as 
"political" rather than "intellectual." 
The "Greater Moral Worth" Move. 
In situations where a perspectival attack is defined as truly "poli-
tical" (and not merely political), it is customary to shroud one's argu-
ments in the cloak of "greater moral worth." This move invites 
combatants to malign each other's character and to minutely question a 
researcher's motivation for undertaking a given project. It is here that 
the great liberal defenders of the democratic faith will "defend to the 
death" the "right" of extremist, right-wing professors to malign the 
downtrodden, on the one hand, while calling into question the pro-
priety and motivations of a homosexual sociologist who plans a study 
of the gay community, on the other. Questions concerning the value 
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orientation of various perspectives and projects are extremely impor-
tant, but they must involve something more than a brawl over who is 
a "better" person if they are to be ethically responsible and intellec-
tually engaging. 
The "Epistemological" Move. 
In this move, perspectival debates are "elevated" to the realm of 
"rational" discourse. The audience is assured that the discussion will be 
"value free" and "above personalities." When structured on dichot-
omous lines, the epistemological move runs roughshod over important 
axiological issues and forces the field of play onto a Procrustean bed 
where incompatible perspectives do not fit. (Ritzer's [1975] multiple 
paradigm trichotomy is not a substantial improvement in this regard.) 
A recent and exceptionally vicious example is provided by Mayhew's 
(1980) attempt to divide all of sociology into structuralist and non-
structuralist camps. His dichotomizing of sociology leads to a faulty 
conceptualization of both Marxism and structuralism and ultimately 
results in absurd, destructive comments such as: "structuralist sociolo-
gists view social psychology as the trained incapacity to comprehend 
the nature of social life" (Mayhew, 1980:357). The typical epistemo-
logical move in contemporary sociology forces debate over the 
"inherent correctness" of a given approach to knowledge and under-
standing. One is judged as either intellectually "right" or intellectually 
"wrong." Neither outcome is justified, of course, as there are no 
universal grounds on which to judge the specifically epistemological 
virtues of any of the current perspectives in sociology. The result is a 
parade of high sounding debates which appear to have intellectual con-
tent, but which are, in fact, bereft of both sound philosophy and 
responsible ethics. An essay such as Mayhew'S is not a responsible 
intellectual discussion. Mayhew'S case, at least, is a rear-guard ideo-
logical attempt to legitimate the authority of a sagging sociological 
elite. 
Responsible ideological allegiance to a discipline requires that its sup-
porters work for the immediate establishment of an emancipatory 
environment for their colleagues, students, and partners in the larger 
society. 
Responsible epistemological/axiological discussions are virtually 
impossible in American sociology today. Responsible dialogue is 
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replaced by destructive, dichotomizing debate which prevents emanci-
pation from the hierarchical, patriarchal power structures of this 
society. Responsible emancipatory critique is suppressed by patri-
archal power-wielders who control disciplinary structure, graduate 
departments, and mainstream journals. We must question this situation 
as we look forward to the close of the Twentieth Century. If we are to 
leave a responsible discipline to the next generation, we must today 
throw off the shackles of patriarchy and hierarchical oppression. If we 
are frustrated and defeated in this attempt, then we must move beyond 
the discipline to seek and support those few here and there who are 
working to establish a truly emancipatory sociology. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing presents a systematic program for responsible 
epistemology, axiology, and ideology in the social sciences. This pro-
gram contains within it, however, a set of nested priorities. First, it is 
necessary to establish sociology as an emancipatory discipline. Without 
this initial step, responsible epistemological/axiological dialogue will be 
suppressed, discredited, and penalized. Attempts to voice responsible 
positions are thwarted through a variety of strategies. Thus, establish-
ment of emancipatory environments for sociological discussion is the 
fundamental priority. 
Second, we must turn to the axiological dimensions of our socio-
logical activities. The social projects which meet the requirements of 
the highest axiological principles must be discovered and identified. 
Only then does it make sense to pursue our third priority: the explica-
tion and construction of knowledge-producing systems which will 
materially assist in the realization of responsible social projects. 
We have spent too long pursuing these priorities in the wrong 
order. Our library shelves are filled with the records of epistemological 
debates in sociology. We find fewer volumes concerned with values and 
not a few of these are devoted to expunging "values" from the socio-
logical lexicon. What few works we find concerning ideology, we are 
willing to footnote occasionally, but rarely as examples of legitimate 
sociological thought. It is time to turn the tide: ideology first, axiology 
second, epistemology third. 
The author wishes to thank professors Mary J 0 Deegan, Werner Leinfellner, and 
Helen Moore for their insights and criticisms during evolution of this paper. 
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